CONSTANTINE THE GREAT
I
THE EMPIRE UNDER DIOCLETIAN
THE catastrophe of the fall of Rome, with all that its fall signified to the fifth century,
came very near to accomplishment in the third. There was a long period when it
seemed as though nothing could save the Empire. Her prestige sank to the
vanishing point. Her armies had forgotten what it was to win a victory over a
foreign enemy. Her Emperors were worthless and incapable. On every side the
frontiers were being pierced and the barriers were giving way.
The Franks swept over Gaul and laid it waste. They
penetrated into Spain; besieged Toledo; and, seizing the galleys which they
found in the Spanish ports, boldly crossed into Mauretanian Africa. Other
confederations of free barbarians from southern Germany had burst through the
wall of Hadrian which protected the Tithe Lands, and had followed the ancient
route of invasion over the Alps. Pannonia had been ravaged by the Sarmatae and
the Quadi. In successive invasions the Goths had overrun Dacia; had poured
round the Black Sea or crossed it on shipboard; had sacked Trebizond and
Chalcedon, and, after traversing Bithynia, had reached the coast at Ephesus. Others
had advanced into Greece and Macedonia and challenged the Roman navies for the
possession of Crete.
Not only was Armenia lost, but the Parthians had
passed the Euphrates, vanquished and taken prisoner the Emperor Valerian, and
surprised the city of Antioch while the inhabitants were idly gathered in the
theatre. Valerian, chained and robed in purple, was kept alive to act as
Sapor's footstool; when he died his skin was tanned and stuffed with straw and
set to grace a Parthian temple. Egypt was in the hands of a rebel who had cut
off the grain supply. And as if such misfortunes were not enough, there was a
succession of terrifying and destructive earthquakes, which wrought their
worst havoc in Asia, though they were felt in Rome and Egypt. These too were
followed by a pestilence which raged for fifteen years and, according to
Eutropius, claimed, when at its height, as many as five thousand victims in a
single day.
It looked, indeed, as though the Roman Empire were
past praying for and its destruction certain. The armies were in widespread
revolt. Rebel usurpers succeeded one another so fast that the period came to
be known as that of the Thirty Tyrants, many of whom were elected, worshipped,
and murdered by their soldiers within the space of a few weeks or months. "You
little know, my friends,- said Saturninus, one of the more candid of these
phantom monarchs, when his troops a few years later insisted that he should pit
himself against Aurelian, "you little know what a poor thing it is to be
an Emperor. Swords hang over our necks; on every side is the menace of spear
and dart. We go in fear of our guards, in terror of our household troops. We
cannot eat what we like, fight when we would, or take up arms for our pleasure.
Moreover, whatever an Emperor's age, it is never what it should be. Is he a
grey beard? Then he is past his prime. Is he young? He has the mad recklessness
of youth. You insist on making me Emperor; you are dragging me to inevitable
death. But I have at least this consolation in dying, that I shall not be able
to die alone." In that celebrated speech, vibrating with bitter irony, we
have the middle of the third century in epitome.
But then the usual miracle of good fortune intervened
to save Rome from herself. The Empire fell into the strong hands of Claudius,
who in two years smote the Goths by land and sea, and of Aurelian, who
recovered Britain and Gaul, restored the northern frontiers, and threw to the
ground the kingdom over which Zenobia ruled from Palmyra. The Empire was thus
restored once more by the genius of two Pannonian peasants, who had found in
the army a career open to talent. The murder of Aurelian, in 275, was followed
by an interregnum of seven months, during which the army seemed to repent of
having slain its general and paid to the Senate a deference which effectually
turned the head—never strong—of that assembly. Vopiscus quotes a letter written
by one senator to another at this period, begging him to return to Rome and
tear himself away from the amusements of Baiae and Puteoli. "The
Senate," he says, "has returned to its ancient status. It is we who
make Emperors; it is our order which has the distribution of offices. Come
back to the city and the Senate House. Rome is flourishing; the whole State is
flourishing. We give Emperors; we make Princes; and we who have begun to
create, can also restrain." The pleasant delusion was soon dispelled. The
legions speedily reassumed the role of king-makers. Tacitus, the senatorial
nominee, ruled only for a year, and another series of soldier Emperors
succeeded. Probus, in six years of incessant fighting, repeated the triumphs
of Aurelian, and carried his successful arms east, west, and north. Carus,
despite his sixty years, crossed the Tigris and made good—at any rate in
part—his threat to render Persia as naked of trees as his own bald head was
bare of hairs. But Carus's reign was brief, and at his death the Empire was
divided between his two sons, Carinus and Numerian. The former was a
voluptuary; the latter, a youth of retiring and scholarly disposition, quite
unfitted for a soldier's life, was soon slain by his Praetorian prefect, Arrius
Aper. But the choice of the army fell upon Diocletian, and he, after stabbing
to the heart the man who had cleared his way to the throne, gathered up into
his strong hands the reins of power in the autumn of 284. He met in battle the
army of Carinus at Margus, in Moesia, during the spring of 285. Carinus was
slain by his officers and Diocletian reigned alone.
But he soon found that he needed a colleague to halve
with him the dangers and the responsibilities of empire. He, therefore, raised
his lieutenant, Maximian, to the purple, with the title of Cesar, and a
twelvemonth later gave him the full name and honours of Augustus. There were
thus two armies, two sets of court officials, and two palaces, but the edicts
ran in the joint name of both Augusti. Then, when still further division seemed
advisable, the principle of imperial partnership was extended, and it was
decided that each Augustus should have a Cesar attached to him. Galerius was
promoted to be the Cesar of Diocletian; Constantius to be the Caesar of
Maximian. Each married the daughter of his patron, and looked forward to
becoming Augustus as soon as his superior should die. The plan was by no means
perfect, but there was much to be said in its favor. An Emperor like
Diocletian, the nominee of the eastern army alone and the son of a Dalmatian
slave, had few, if any, claims upon the natural loyalty of his subjects. Himself
a successful adventurer, he knew that other adventurers would rise to
challenge his position, if they could find an army to back them. By entrusting
Maximian with the sovereignty of the West, he forestalled Maximian's almost
certain rivalry, and the four great frontiers each required the presence of a
powerful army and an able commander-in-chief. By having three colleagues, each
of whom might hope in time to become the senior Augustus, Diocletian secured
himself, so far as security was possible, against military rebellion.
Unquestionably, too, this decentralization tended
towards general efficiency. It was more than one man's task, whatever his
capacity, to hold together the Empire as Diocletian found it. Gaul was ablaze
from end to end with a peasants' war. Carausius ruled for eight years in
Britain, which he temporarily detached from the Empire, and, secure in his
naval strength, forced Diocletian and Maximian, much to their disgust, to recognize
him as a brother Augustus. This archpirate, as they called him, was crushed at
last, but whenever Constantius crossed into Britain it was necessary for
Maximian to move up to the vacant frontier of the Rhine and mount guard in his
place. We hear, too, of Maximian fighting the Moors in Mauretania. War was
thus incessant in the West. In the East, Diocletian recovered Armenia for
Roman influence in 287 by placing his nominee, Tiridates, on the throne. This
was done without a breach with Parthia, but in 296 Tiridates was expelled and
war ensued. Diocletian summoned Galerius from the Danube and entrusted him with
the command. But Galerius committed the same blunder which Crassus had made three
centuries and a half before. He led his troops into the wastes of the
Mesopotamian desert and suffered the inevitable disaster. When he returned with
the survivors of his army to Antioch, Diocletian, it is said, rode forth to
meet him; received him with cold displeasure; and, instead of taking him up
into his chariot, compelled him to march alongside on foot, in spite of his
purple robe. However, in the following year, 297, Galerius faced the Parthian
with a new army, took the longer but less hazardous route through Armenia, and
utterly overwhelmed the enemy in a night attack. The victory was so complete
that Narses sued for peace, paying for the boon no less a price than the whole
of Mesopotamia and five provinces in the valley of the Tigris, and renouncing
all claim to the sovereignty of Armenia.
This was the greatest victory which Rome had won in
the East since the campaigns of Trajan and Vespasian. It was followed by fifty
years of profound peace; and the ancient feud between Rome and Parthia was not
renewed until the closing days of the reign of Constantine. Lactantius, of
whose credibility as a historian we shall speak later on, sneers at the victory
of Galerius, which he says was "easily won" over an enemy encumbered
by baggage, and he represents him as being so elated with his success that when
Diocletian addressed him in a letter of congratulation by the name of Cesar, he
exclaimed, with glowing eyes and a voice of thunder, "How long shall I be merely
Caesar?" But there is no word of corroboration from any other source. On
the contrary, we can see that Diocletian, whose forte was diplomacy rather
than generalship, was on the best of terms with his son-in-law, Galerius, who
regarded him not with contempt, but with the most profound respect. Diocletian
and Galerius, for their lifetime at any rate, had settled the Eastern question
on a footing entirely satisfactory and honorable to Rome. A long line of
fortresses was established on the new frontier, within which there was perfect
security for trade and commerce, and the result was a rapid recovery from the
havoc caused by the Gothic and Parthian irruptions.
Though Diocletian had divided the supreme power, he
was still the moving and controlling spirit, by whose nod all things were
governed. He had chosen for his own special domain Asia, Syria, and Egypt,
fixing his capital at Nicomedia, which he had filled with stately palaces,
temples, and public buildings, for he indulged the dream of making his city the
rival of Rome. Galerius ruled the Danubian provinces with Greece and Illyricum
from his capital at Sirmium. Maximian, the Augustus of the West, ruled over
Italy, Africa, and Spain from Milan; Constantius watched over Gaul and Britain,
with headquarters at Treves and at York. But everywhere the writ of Diocletian
ran. He took the majestic name of Jovius, while Maximian styled himself
Herculius; and it stands as a marvellous tribute to his commanding influence
that we hear of no friction between the
four masters of the world.
Diocletian profoundly modified the character of the
Roman Principate. He orientalised it, adopting frankly and openly the symbols
and paraphernalia of royalty which had been so repugnant to the Roman temper.
Hitherto the Roman Emperors had been, first and foremost, Imperators, heads of
the army, soldiers in the purple. Diocletian became a King, clad in sumptuous
robes, stiff with embroidery and jewels. Instead of approaching with the old
military salute, those who came into his presence bent the knee and prostrated
themselves in adoration. The monarch surrounded himself, not with military
prefects, but with chamberlains and court officials, the hierarchy of the
palace, not of the camp. We cannot wholly impute this change to vanity or to
that littleness of mind which is pleased with pomp and elaborate ceremonial.
Diocletian was too great a man to be swayed by paltry motives. It was rather
that his subjects had abdicated their old claim to be called a free and
sovereign people, and were ready to be slaves. The whole senatorial order had
been debarred by Gallienus from entering the army, and had acquiesced without
apparent protest in an edict which closed to its members the profession of
arms. Diocletian thought that his throne would be safer by removing it from the
ken of the outside world, by screening it from vulgar approach, by deepening
the mystery and impressiveness attaching to palaces, by elaborating the court
ceremonial, and exalting even the simplest of domestic services into the
dignity of a liturgy. It may be that these changes intensified the servility of
the subject, and sapped still further the manhood and self-respect of the race.
Let it not be forgotten, however, that the ceremonial of the modern courts of
Europe may be traced directly back to the changes introduced by Diocletian, and
also that the ceremonial, which the older school of Romans would have thought
degrading and effeminate, was, perhaps, calculated to impress by its
stateliness, beauty, and dignity the barbarous nations which were supplying
the Roman armies with troops.
We will reserve to a later chapter some account of the
remodeled administration, which Constantine for the most part accepted without
demur. Here we may briefly mention the decentralization which Diocletian
carried out in the provinces. Lactantius says that "he carved the provinces up into little fragments that he
might fill the earth with terror," and suggests that be multiplied officials
in order to wring more money out of his subjects. That is an enemy's perversion
of a wise statesman's plan for securing efficiency by lessening the
administrative areas, and bringing them within working limits. Diocletian split
up the Empire into twelve great dioceses. Each diocese again was subdivided
into provinces. There were fifty-seven of these when he came to the throne;
when he quitted it there were ninety-six. The system had grave faults, for the
principles on which the finances of the Empire rested were thoroughly
mischievous and unsound. But the reign of Diocletian was one of rapid recuperation
and great prosperity, such as the Roman world had not enjoyed since the days
of the Antonines.
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