Not long before his death, Maximilian had discovered great solicitude to preserve this dignity in the Austrian family, and to procure the king of Spain to be chosen his successor. But he himself having never been crowned by the pope, a ceremony deemed essential in that age, was considered only as emperor elect. Though historians have not attended to that distinction, neither the Italian nor German chancery bestowed any other title upon him than that of king of the Romans; and no example occurring in history of any person's being chosen a successor to a king of the Romans, the Germans, always tenacious of their forms, and unwilling to confer upon Charles an office for which their constitution knew no name, obstinately refused to gratify Maximilian in that point.

By his death, this difficulty was at once removed, and Charles openly aspired to that dignity which his grandfather had attempted, without success, to secure for him. At the same time Francis I, a powerful rival, entered the lists against him; and the attention of all Europe was fixed upon this competition, no less illustrious from the high rank of the candidates, than from the importance of time prize for which they contended. Each of them urged his pretensions with sanguine expectations, and with no unpromising prospect of success. Charles considered the Imperial crown as belonging to him of right, from its long continuance in the Austrian line; he knew that none of the German princes possessed power or influence enough to appear as his antagonist; he flattered himself that no consideration would induce the natives of Germany to exalt any foreign prince to a dignity, which during so many ages had been deemed peculiar to their own nation; and least of all, that they would confer this honor upon Francis I, the sovereign of a people whose genius, and laws, and manners, differed so widely from those of the Germans, that it was hardly possible to establish any cordial union between them; he trusted not a little to the effect of Maximilian’s negotiations, which, though they did not attain their end, had prepared the minds of the Germans for his elevation to the Imperial throne; but what he relied on as a chief recommendation, was the fortunate situation of his hereditary dominions in Germany, which served as a natural barrier to the empire against the encroachments of the Turkish power.

The conquests, the abilities, and the ambition of Sultan Selim II had spread over Europe, at that time, a general and well-founded alarm. By his victories over the Mamalukes, and the extirpation of that gallant body of men, he had not only added Egypt and Syria to his empire, but had secured to it such a degree of internal tranquility, that he was ready to turn against Christendom the whole force of his arms, which nothing hitherto had been able to resist. The most effectual expedient for stopping the progress of this torrent, seemed to be the election of an emperor, possessed of extensive territories in that country, where its first impression would be felt, and who, besides, could combat this formidable enemy with all the forces of a powerful monarchy, and with all the wealth furnished by the mines of the new world, or the commerce of the Low Countries. These were the arguments by which Charles publicly supported his claim; and to men of integrity and reflection, they appeared to be not only plausible but convincing. He did not, however, trust the success of his cause to these alone. Great sums of money were remitted from Spain; all the refinements and artifice of negotiation were employed; and a considerable body of troops, kept on foot, at that time, by the states of the Circle of Suabia, was secretly taken into his pay. The venal were gained by presents; the objections of the more scrupulous were answered or eluded; some feeble princes were threatened and overawed.

On the other hand, Francis supported his claim with equal eagerness, and no less confidence of its being well founded. His emissaries contended that it was now high time to convince the princes of the house of Austria that the Imperial crown was elective, and not hereditary; that other persons might aspire to an honor which their arrogance had accus­tomed them to regard as the property of their family; that it required a sovereign of mature judgment, and of approved abilities, to hold the reins of government in a country where such unknown opinions concerning religion had been published, as had thrown the minds of men into an uncommon agitation, which threatened the most violent effects; that a young prince, without experience, and who had hitherto given no specimens of his genius for command, was no fit match for Selim, a monarch grown old in the art of war, and in the course of victory; whereas a king who in his early youth had triumphed over the valor and discipline of the Swiss, till then reckoned invincible, would be an antagonist not unworthy the conqueror of the East; that the fire and impetuosity of the French cavalry, added to the discipline and stability of the German infantry, would form an army so irresistible, that, instead of waiting the approach of the Ottoman forces, it might carry hostilities into the heart of their dominions; that the election of Charles would be inconsistent with the fundamental constitution, by which the person who holds the crown of Naples is excluded from aspiring to the Imperial dignity; that his elevation to that honor would soon kindle a war in Italy, on account of his pretensions to the duchy of Milan, the effects of which could not fail of reaching the empire, and might prove fatal to it. But while the French ambassadors enlarged upon these and other topics of the same kind, in all the courts of Germany, Francis, sensible of the prejudices entertained against him as a foreigner, unacquainted with the German language or manners, endeavored to overcome these, and to gain the favor of the princes by immense gifts, and by infinite promises. As the expeditious method of transmitting money, and the decent mode of conveying a bribe, by bills of exchange, were then little known, the French ambassadors travelled with a train of horses loaded with treasure, an equipage not very honorable for that prince by whom they were employed, and infamous for those to whom they were sent.

The other European princes could not remain indifferent spectators of a contest, the decision of which so nearly affected every one of them. Their common interest ought naturally to have formed a general combination, in order to disappoint both competitors, and to prevent either of them from obtaining such a preeminence in power and dignity, as might prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe. But the ideas with respect to a proper distribution and balance of power were so lately introduced into the system of European policy, that they were not hitherto objects of sufficient attention. The passions of some princes, the want of foresight in others, and the fear of giving offence to the candidates, hindered such a salutary union of the powers of Europe, and rendered them either totally negligent of the public safety, or kept them from exerting themselves with vigour in its behalf.

The Swiss Cantons, though they dreaded the elevation of either of the contending monarchs, and though they wished to have seen some prince whose dominions were less extensive, and whose power was more moderate, seated on the Imperial throne, were prompted, however, by their hatred of the French nation, to give an open preference to the pretensions of Charles, while they used their utmost influence to frustrate those of Francis.

The Venetians easily discerned, that it was the interest of their republic to have both the rivals set aside; but their jealousy of the house of Austria, whose ambition and neighborhood had been fatal to their grandeur, would not permit them to act up to their own ideas, and led them hastily to give the sanction of their approbation to the claim of the French king.

It was equally the interest, and more in the power of Henry VIII of England, to prevent either Francis or Charles from acquiring a dignity which would raise them so far above other monarchs. But though Henry often boasted that he held the balance of Europe in his hand, he had neither the steady attention, the accurate discernment, nor the dispassionate temper which that delicate function required. On this occasion, it mortified his vanity so much, to think that he had not entered early into that noble competition which reflected such honor upon the two antagonists, that he took a resolution of sending an ambassador into Germany, and of declaring himself a candidate for the Imperial throne. The ambassador, though loaded with caresses by the German princes and the pope’s nuncio, informed his master, that he could hope for no success in a claim which he had been so late in preferring. Henry, imputing his disappointment to that circumstance alone, and soothed with this ostentatious display of his own importance, seems to have taken no farther part in the matter, either by contributing to thwart both his rivals, or to promote one of them.

Leo X, a pontiff no less renowned for his political abilities, than for his love of the arts, was the only prince of the age who observed the motions of the two contending monarchs with a prudent attention, or who discovered a proper solicitude for the public safety. The imperial and papal jurisdiction interfered in so many instances, the complaints of usurpation were so numerous on both sides, and the territories of the church owed their security so little to their own force, and so much to the weakness of the powers around them, that nothing was so formidable to the court of Rome as an emperor with extensive dominions, or of enterprising genius. Leo trembled at the prospect of beholding the Imperial crown placed on the head of the king of Spain and of Naples and the master of the new world; nor was he less afraid of seeing a king of France, who was the duke of Milan and lord of Genoa, exalted to that dignity. He foretold that the election of either of them would be fatal to the independence of the holy see, to the peace of Italy, and perhaps to the liberties of Europe. But to oppose them with any prospect of success, required address and caution in proportion to the greatness of their power, and their opportunities of taking revenge. Leo was defective in neither. He secretly exhorted the German princes to place one of their own number on the Imperial throne, which many of them were capable of filling with honor. He put them in mind of the constitution by which the kings of Naples were forever excluded from that dignity. He warmly exhorted the French king to persist in his claim, not from any desire that he should gain his end, but as he foresaw that the Germans would be more disposed to favor the king of Spain, he hoped that Francis himself, when he discovered his own chance of success to be desperate, would be stimulated by resentment and the spirit of rivalship, to concur with all his interest in raising some third person to the head of the empire; or, on the other hand, if Francis should make an unexpected progress, he did not doubt but that Charles would be induced by similar motives to act the same part; and thus, by a prudent attention, the mutual jealousy of the two rivals might be so dexterously managed, as to disappoint both. But this scheme, the only one which a prince in Leo’s situation could adopt, though concerted with great wisdom, was executed with little discretion. The French ambassadors in Germany fed their master with vain hopes; the pope’s nuncio, being gained by them, altogether forgot the instructions which he had received; and Francis persevered so long and with such obstinacy in urging his own pretensions, as rendered all Leo's measures abortive.

Such were the hopes of the candidates, and the views of the different princes, when the diet was opened according to form at Frankfort [June 17]. The right of choosing an emperor had long been vested in seven great princes, distinguished by the name of electors, the origin of whose office, as well as the nature and extent of their powers, have already been explained. These were at that time, Albert of Brandenburgh, archbishop of Mentz; Herman count de Wied, archbishop of Cologne; Richard de Grieffenklau, archbishop of Triers;  Lewis, king of Bohemia; Lewis, count palatine of the Rhine; Frederic, duke of Saxony; and Joachim I, marquis of Brandenburgh. Notwithstanding the artful arguments produced by the ambassadors of the two kings in favor of their respective masters, and in spite of all their solicitations, intrigues, and presents, the electors did not forget that maxim on which the liberty of the German constitution was thought to be founded. Among the members of the Germanic body, which is a great republic composed of states almost independent, the first principle of patriotism is to depress and limit the power of the emperor; and of this idea, so natural under such a form of government, a German politician seldom loses sight. No prince of considerable power, or extensive dominions, had for some ages been raised to the Imperial throne. To this prudent precaution many of the great families in Germany owed the splendor and independence which they had acquired during that period. To elect either of the contending monarchs, would have been a gross violation of that salutary maxim; would have given to the empire a master instead of a head; and would have reduced themselves from the rank of being almost his equals, to the condition of his subjects.

Full of these ideas, all the electors turned their eyes towards Frederic, duke of Saxony, a prince of such eminent virtue and abilities, as to be distinguished by the name of the Sage, and with one voice they offered him the Imperial crown. He was not dazzled with that object, which monarchs, so far superior to him in power, courted with such eagerness; and after deliberating upon the matter a short time, he rejected it with a magnanimity and disinterestedness no less singular than admirable. "Nothing", he observed, "could be more impolitic, than an obstinate adherence to a maxim which, though sound and just in many cases, was not applicable to all. In times of tranquility (said he) we wish for an emperor who has not power to invade our liberties; times of danger demand one who is able to secure our safety. The Turkish armies, led by a gallant and victorious monarch, are now assembling . They are ready to pour in upon Germany with a violence unknown in former ages. New conjunctures call for new expedients. The Imperial scepter must be committed to some hand more powerful than mine, or that of any other German prince. We possess neither dominions, nor revenues, nor authority, which enables us to encounter such a formidable enemy. Recourse must be had, in this exigency, to one of the rival monarchs. Each of them can bring into the field forces sufficient for our defence. But as the king of Spain is of German extraction; as he is a member and prince of the empire by the territories which descend to him from his grandfather; as his dominions stretch along that frontier which lies most exposed to the enemy; his claim is preferable, in my opinion, to that of a stranger to our language, to our blood, and to our country; and therefore I give my vote to confer on him the Imperial crown”.

This opinion, dictated by such uncommon generosity, and supported by arguments so plausible, made a deep impression on the electors. The king of Spain's ambassadors, sensible of the important service which Frederic had done their master, sent him a considerable sum of money as the first token of that prince’s gratitude. But he who had greatness of mind to refuse a crown, disdained to receive a bribe; and, upon their entreating that at least he would permit them to distribute part of that sum among his attendants, he replied “that he could not prevent them from accepting what should be offered, but whoever took a single florin should he dismissed next morning from his service”.

No prince in Germany could now aspire to a dignity, which Frederic had declined, for reasons applicable to them all. It remained to make a choice between the two great competitors. But besides the prejudice in Charles’s favor arising from his birth, as well as the situation of his German dominions, he owed not a little to the abilities of the cardinal de Gurk, and the zeal of Erard de la Mark, bishop of Liege, two of his ambassadors, who had conducted their negotiations with more prudence and address than those entrusted by the French king. The former, who had long been the minister and favorite of Maximilian, was well acquainted with the art of managing the Germans; and the latter, having been disappointed of a cardinal’s hat by Francis, employed all the malicious ingenuity with which the desire of revenge inspires an ambitious mind, in thwarting the measures of that monarch. The Spanish party among the electors daily gained ground; and even the pope’s nuncio, being convinced that it was vain to make any further opposition, endeavored to acquire some merit with the future emperor, by offering voluntarily, in the name of his master, a dispensation to hold the Imperial crown in conjunction with that of Naples.

On the twenty-eighth day of June, five months and ten days after the death of Maximilian, this important contest, which had held an Europe in suspense, was decided. Six of the electors had already declared for the king of Spain; and the archbishop of Triers, the only firm adherent to the French interest, having at last joined his brethren, Charles was, by the unanimous voice of the electoral college, raised to the Imperial throne.

But though the electors consented, from various motives, to promote Charles to that high station, they discovered, at the same time, great jealousy of his extraordinary power, and endeavored, with the utmost solicitude, to provide against his encroaching on the privileges of the Germanic body. It had long been the custom to demand of every new emperor a confirmation of these privileges, and to require a promise that he would never violate them in any instance. While princes, who were formidable neither from extent of territory, nor of genius, possessed the Imperial throne, a general and verbal engagement to this purpose was deemed sufficient. But under an emperor so powerful as Charles, other precautions seemed necessary. A Capitulation or claim of right was formed, in which the privileges and immunities of the electors, of the princes of the empire, of the cities, and of every other member of the Germanic body, are enumerated. This capitulation was immediately signed by Charles’s ambassadors in the name of their master, and he himself, at his coronation, confirmed it in the most solemn manner. Since that period, the electors have continued to prescribe the same conditions to all his successors; and the capitulation or mutual contract between the emperor and his subjects, is considered in Germany as a strong barrier against the progress of the Imperial power, and as the great charter of their liberties, to which they often appeal.

The important intelligence of this election was conveyed in nine days from Frankfort to Barcelona, where Charles was still detained by the obstinacy of the Catalonian Cortes, which had not hitherto brought to an issue any of the affairs which came before it. He received the account with the joy natural to a young and aspiring mind, on an accession of power and dignity. which raised him so far above the other princes of Europe. Then it was that those vast prospects, which allured him during his whole administration, began to open, and from this era we may date the formation, and are able to trace the gradual progress, of a grand system of enterprising ambition, which renders the history of his reign so worthy of attention.

 

The Spanish Reaction